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THE GREAT WHITE FLEET SAILS TODAY?
Twenty-First-Century Logistics Lessons from the 1907–1909  
Voyage of the Great White Fleet
Christopher McMahon
We need above all things, a proportionate Navy, one that is perfect in 
every essential particular, not simply the ships that are necessary for 
fighting, but the ships that are necessary to sustain the ships that do the 
fighting, to carry coal [fuel] and supplies . . . and without these ships, 
the Navy would be as helpless in case of war as we would be without the 
battleships or the fighting ships of the Navy.
SENATOR FRANCIS G� NEWLANDS (D-NV),  
CONGRESSIONAL HEARING, MARCH 1908
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n the numerous conflicts since the founding of the republic, and in particular 
since the late nineteenth century, the United States has relied on its ability to 
project military power far from its shores� With the country isolated from much 
of the world by massive oceans, America’s military has employed sealift and—to 
some extent, since early in World War II—airlift to move troops, equipment, am-
munition, and supplies around the world�1 The majority of this lift capacity has 
been provided by commercial merchant vessels under the operational control of 
the military�
World War II offers the most spectacular exam-
ple of strategic lift in the history of warfare� Using 
hundreds of Army and Navy logistics vessels and 
over five thousand merchant vessels, the United 
States carried more than 132 million measure-
ment tons of cargo during the war�2 This included 
the movement of nearly 1�4 million vehicles, two 
thousand locomotives, and nearly eight million 
soldiers, plus vast amounts of ammunition, sup-
plies, and other equipment�3 As it mounted the 
largest naval armada in history, the U�S� Navy 
I
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would have found it impossible to achieve its accomplishments in the Atlantic 
and Pacific theaters without the thousands of Army and Navy logistics ships and 
commercial merchant ships that supported the fleet�
Recognizing the direct relationship of logistics to the ability of the U�S� mili-
tary to forward-deploy around the world and acknowledging the need to coor-
dinate military lift capabilities for all the services, the U�S� Merchant Marine, 
and the airline industry, the U�S� government created the U�S� Transportation 
Command (USTRANSCOM, or simply TRANSCOM) in 1987�4 TRANSCOM is 
headquartered at Scott Air Force Base in Illinois and is a four-star unified com-
mand� TRANSCOM components include the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command 
(AMC), the Army’s Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command 
(SDDC), and the Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC)� Augmenting and 
supporting MSC is the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) of the Maritime Administra-
tion (MARAD)� The RRF consists of government-owned ships that MARAD 
and its contracted companies maintain in a ready status� These ships fall under 
MSC’s operational control when activated and are used in sealift emergencies to 
support all the armed services� For more than thirty years—through numerous 
conflicts, military actions, and deployments—TRANSCOM and its component 
commands (and MARAD’s RRF) have proved their efficiency and effectiveness� 
They have played vital roles in the success of American military actions—in the 
air, on land, and at sea�
Yet, as well as many military leaders and planners in all the services under-
stand and appreciate the critical importance of sealift logistics, too often as time 
passes some military professionals and politicians forget or overlook the lessons 
learned from past logistics failures� We are again at a time in history when the 
importance and vulnerability of sealift, for both military and commercial activi-
ties, need to be considered and reassessed� The voyage of the U�S� Navy’s Great 
White Fleet around the world from December 1907 to February 1909 offers some 
powerful lessons in this regard�
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, European powers rushed 
headlong into the building and expanding of global empires around the world�5 
As the twentieth century dawned, with most of the United States and its terri-
tories explored, America too launched itself into imperialist actions as it sought 
great-power status� A particular manifestation was the Great White Fleet’s voy-
age, which seemingly proved that America’s navy could project power forward 
to any region of the world and defend the country’s newly acquired overseas 
territories and its trade� Credit can be given to President Theodore Roosevelt 
for envisioning this voyage, which, by most measures, was an unparalleled 
success� Never before had any navy in the world embarked on such a voyage, 
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circumnavigating the globe and visiting as many countries with such a large and 
powerful battle fleet�
Less known with regard to the 1907–1909 voyage is the logistics backstory� 
This background demonstrates the critical importance of strategic sealift and the 
ultimate vulnerability of any navy, army, or air force that is dependent on logistics 
ships for fuel, stores, and ammunition� This story provides lessons that remain as 
important for all the armed services of the twenty-first century as they were to the 
U�S� Navy of the early twentieth century—lessons that often go unappreciated or 
forgotten� While today the U�S� Navy, and the U�S� military writ large, have great 
logistics capabilities through the strategic sealift managed by USTRANSCOM, 
MSC, RRF, and the commercial U�S� Merchant Marine, there are serious chal-
lenges that need to be considered and overcome� The ability of America’s navy 
and all its armed services to forward-deploy depends on doing so�
BACKGROUND TO THE VOYAGE
The U�S� Navy ended the Civil War with, in theory, almost seven hundred ships 
in commission� This included some sixty-five ironclads� But by 1880, Navy ves-
sels had dropped to only forty-eight in number—and all of them were essentially 
technologically obsolete�6 During this period, the U�S� Merchant Marine was in 
equally poor shape� To make matters worse, those shipowners who had trans-
ferred their vessels to neutral flags during the Civil War to avoid attacks from 
Confederate forces were considered traitors, so Congress passed a law specifically 
forbidding the reflagging of those ships back under the U�S� flag�7
Exhausted from the war and with the huge interior of their country largely 
unoccupied (except by native peoples) and offering great promise, Americans 
turned inward and ignored the sea, their navy, and their merchant marine� Par-
tially contributing to the lack of interest in a sizable U�S� Merchant Marine was 
the fact that by 1890 there were twenty-two coastal states and twenty-two inland 
states, resulting in a decline in political support for maritime industries�8
During these years following the Civil War, industrialization spread rapidly in 
the United States; American industry eclipsed that of Great Britain by the end of 
the century�9 With industrialization came incredible wealth, which went to a new 
class of Gilded Age businessmen but spread as well to many average Americans 
and the country at large�
As the United States became more dependent on overseas trade during this 
period, political leaders in Washington began to look at the decrepit state of the 
Navy and the Merchant Marine� There was fear that if overseas powers threatened 
seagoing trade, the United States did not possess a navy adequate to protect the 
nation’s interests, much less a merchant marine capable of carrying a significant 
portion of the nation’s international trade�10
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It was Secretary of the Navy William H� Hunt who began to build a new and 
more powerful U�S� Navy in the early 1880s� Under his leadership and that of 
subsequent Navy secretaries, Congress appropriated funds for the construction 
of modern cruisers�11 By 1890, six armored cruisers had been built and were 
operational� During the same year, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN (later 
rear admiral and President of the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island), 
published his seminal book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783� 
In the book, Mahan argued that sea power was critical to establishing national 
strength and dominance in global trade�12 (Importantly, Mahan also noted that 
one of the critical attributes of sea power was a capable and robust commercial 
merchant marine, although ever since Mahan first offered his thesis most in 
America have overlooked this observation�)13
Mahan’s book had a tremendous impact, not just in the United States but 
around the world� Huge, expensive battleships, large fleets, and decisive battles 
seemed to be the order of the day� At the same time, newcomers to colonialism, 
such as Germany, Japan, and the United States, clamored for overseas colonies—
if necessary, to be obtained and then protected by the force of their navies�
In the United States, the Naval Appropriations Act for 1891 (better known as 
the Battleship Act of 1890) for the first time authorized the construction of three 
battleships, which would be christened USS Indiana, USS Massachusetts, and 
USS Oregon� During the next ten years, several more battleships were completed, 
bringing the U�S� Navy, by some metrics, from a ranking of twelfth among the 
world’s navies in 1870 to fifth place�14
PRESIDENT TEDDY ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT WHITE FLEET
By the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the U�S� Navy had de-
stroyed the Spanish fleets in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico and seized 
the Philippines and Puerto Rico as possessions in a new “American Empire�” The 
American navy, with its new and apparently proven ships, was the pride of the 
nation�15
As luck would have it for the growth of the fleet, the political sun continued to 
shine on the Navy with the accession of Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency in 
1901� As a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the early days of the war with 
Spain, Roosevelt was an ardent advocate of naval power and a fervent believer in 
the words of Mahan� Under his tenure as president, the Navy continued to grow 
in both size and power�
World events during Roosevelt’s administration contributed to support for a 
larger and more powerful navy� In 1903, the Roosevelt administration eagerly 
encouraged and provided resources to rebels in Panama to help them gain inde-
pendence from Colombia� The motive was ultimately to establish a treaty with a 
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new Panamanian government whereby the United States could build and operate 
a canal across the isthmus� This would enable the U�S� Navy to move from ocean 
to ocean rapidly to deal with conflicts in Europe or Asia�16 U�S� tensions with 
Japan began during these years, and the shocking defeat of the Russian fleet at 
the naval battle of Tsushima during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 seemed to 
prove Mahan’s theories of decisive naval battles and the need for large, powerful 
battle fleets� Roosevelt and Congress grew concerned about the ability of the U�S� 
Navy to protect newly acquired territories and colonies in the Pacific, notably 
the Philippines�17 The launching of HMS Dreadnought in 1906 also had profound 
effects on the psychology of naval strategists around the world� Dreadnought was 
essentially an all-big-gun ship, and its steam-powered turbines made it fast for 
battleships of the day�18 Over the course of the next three years, the world’s navies 
ordered nearly seventy of these powerful—and expensive—ships�19
In 1901, the U�S� Navy possessed nine battleships, with eight more under 
construction� Responding to pressure from Roosevelt and support from the 
press and the public, Congress authorized the construction of an additional ten 
battleships and four armored cruisers in the years from 1901 to 1905� In 1906 and 
1907, two additional battleships were authorized, and in 1908 two more� By this 
time, the United States had emerged as a first-rate naval power�20 In fact, in 1908, 
the U�S� Navy ranked as number two in the world, second only to Great Britain’s 
Royal Navy�21 (This would change in ensuing years as Germany continued its na-
val arms race with Britain; its navy moved from the number three to the number 
two spot by the start of World War I�)
During the early 1900s, navies, and especially their battleships, became tan-
gible and dramatic symbols of national power� Even countries that could ill afford 
the cost of building and operating battleships built one or two to demonstrate 
that they too were great naval powers, or at least to provide some substantive 
support for the notion� The best way to show off a nation’s power was to hold 
or participate in naval expositions or parades or to visit the ports of other major 
naval powers� Indeed, it was a statement of respect when a nation received an 
invitation to join another nation’s naval festivities, and when invitations were 
received utmost attention was given to impressing others with a display of one’s 
own powerful battleships�22 In this environment, President Roosevelt first con-
ceived of sailing a USN fleet around the world�
THE VOYAGE OF THE GREAT WHITE FLEET
Roosevelt’s plan for sending America’s battle fleet around the world apparently 
began to develop in 1905�23 The genesis of this idea may have been his observation 
of and admiration for the epic transit of Russia’s Baltic Fleet from Saint Petersburg 
to the Far East to challenge the Japanese navy in the Russo-Japanese War�
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In 1904, the tensions between Japan and Russia over Korea and Manchuria 
reached the boiling point and the two nations found themselves at war� The ill-
trained and ill-equipped Russian Far East Naval Squadron was no match for the 
modern and highly trained Japanese navy, which, on February 8, 1904, attacked 
and heavily damaged what Russian naval power was available in eastern Russia�24
In response, the tsar decided to send the entire Baltic Fleet to the Far East 
to engage the Japanese, destroy their fleet, and quickly win the war—or so he 
thought� But it was not to be so� The Russian fleet departed Revel (modern Tal-
linn, Estonia) on October 15, 1904� After a grueling 18,000-mile journey from 
northern Europe to the Tsushima Strait off the coast of Japan, on May 27, 1905, 
the Russian fleet engaged the Japanese� In the ensuing fierce battle most of the 
Russian ships—including all the battleships—were sunk, with only a few ships 
reaching Russian ports and three cruisers escaping to the Philippines�25 The war 
soon came to a close� Both sides, exhausted, agreed to peace negotiations and 
eventually signed a treaty—engineered by none other than President Theodore 
Roosevelt—in Portsmouth, New Hampshire�26
Despite this complete disaster (from the Russian perspective), Roosevelt 
was probably very impressed by the long voyage of the Russian Baltic Fleet— 
particularly since the world press covered it extensively during the seven-month 
span� He may have been inspired to send the U�S� Navy’s battle fleet on an even 
longer voyage� Then there were the unsettling tensions with Japan� Considering 
Japan’s devastating defeat of the Russian fleet at Tsushima, its growing belliger-
ence in China and Korea, and the rapid growth of its merchant marine, Ameri-
cans on the West Coast were becoming increasingly uneasy� The initial voyage 
of the Great White Fleet (from the American East Coast to the West Coast) was 
clearly an attempt to reassure Americans that their Navy could defend the West 
Coast�27 In his autobiography, written in 1913, Roosevelt also stated that the pur-
pose of the cruise was to “impress the American people in order to gain support 
for a program to build more battleships�”28
Amid the growing tensions with Japan in the summer of 1907, it was originally 
Admiral George Dewey who suggested to Roosevelt that he send the battle fleet 
to the Far East as a show of force�29 Apparently during that summer Roosevelt 
began to consider seriously a “world cruise” for the fleet, but he kept this idea 
to himself for a time� Then, in late summer, the Roosevelt administration an-
nounced that sixteen battleships would make a voyage from the East to the West 
Coast of the United States via the Strait of Magellan� In December 1907, the fleet 
departed Hampton Roads, Virginia, bound for San Francisco�30 Initially this fleet 
included sixteen battleships, eight armored cruisers, and six torpedo boats�31 The 
officers and men of the fleet, at this point, were aware that the voyage probably 
would continue around the world; the world press was still in speculative mode, 
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but as the weeks progressed intentions for the voyage of the Great White Fleet 
became clear�32 The ships would travel from the West Coast of the United States 
to New Zealand, Australia, Japan, and the Far East, then to Sri Lanka, through the 
Suez Canal and the Mediterranean to Spain, and finally across the Atlantic and 
back to Hampton Roads, arriving in early 1909�
This would be a 43,000-mile, around-the-globe voyage to twenty ports on 
six continents� It was a world first for the large battle fleet of any nation—an ac-
complishment that brought envy, concern, pride, or criticism, depending on the 
source�33 It was, in any case, an impressive accomplishment for a relatively young 
nation and a rising naval power�
THE “REST OF THE STORY”: COAL AND STORES
The expression “An army marches on its stomach” (attributed to both Frederick 
the Great and Napoléon) is well understood by most people� It seems rather 
obvious that food and fuel (fodder for horses was the equivalent of the latter in 
premodern times) are basic necessities if an army is to move from one point to 
another� What may be less obvious is that the same is true for a navy� Granted, 
some types of warships can carry substantial amounts of food, supplies, fuel, and 
ammunition, but in general warships’ steaming range, and therefore their ability 
to fight, is limited—often only a few days’ underway time�
The ships of the Great White Fleet were no exception� In that era, a battleship 
steaming at sea speed consumed its coal supply within a week�34 Fresh water—
crucial throughout maritime history—was even more important in the age of 
steam power, since steamships were dependent on liberal amounts of fresh wa-
ter to resupply their boilers�35 Then there was the question of feeding warships’ 
crews� On the voyage of the Great White Fleet, the crew complement of the fleet 
consisted of some fourteen thousand men�36 The one other often-critical com-
modity for warships, ammunition, was not a concern on the peacetime voyage of 
the Great White Fleet—in stark contrast to the situation of the Russian fleet as it 
steamed toward its fateful rendezvous in the Tsushima Strait�37
Roosevelt and Navy planners were well aware of the supply issues facing the 
Great White Fleet, but the solutions were daunting and dangerous� For example, 
they were aware that Admiral Dewey’s wholesale destruction of the Spanish fleet 
in the Philippines and the U�S� Navy’s pursuit of the Spanish fleet off Cuba dur-
ing the Spanish-American War were, in many respects, quite fortuitous because 
they exposed that the Navy’s ability to resupply its combatants with coal, stores, 
and ammunition during war was seriously limited and reliant on foreign-flag 
merchant ships�38
Despite the massive growth in the number of USN battleships and other com-
batants from 1898 into the first decade of the new century, the Navy possessed 
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only three U�S�-flag supply ships: USS Celtic, USS Culgoa, and USS Glacier�39 Fur-
ther complicating this vulnerability at the time of the voyage of the Great White 
Fleet, the Navy possessed only six old colliers (some still rigged with sails) to sup-
port the fleet on its voyage� It was estimated that the fleet would consume upward 
of five hundred thousand tons of coal just on the voyage from the United States to 
the Far East�40 The Russians, for example, had needed to charter sixty foreign-flag 
colliers to supply their fleet on its voyage from the Baltic to the Far East�41
A study the Naval War College conducted in early 1907 estimated that the 
Great White Fleet would require some one hundred chartered colliers to support 
it on its voyage around the world�42 The problem was that there were no U�S�-flag 
colliers to charter, because the U�S� Merchant Marine had been allowed to atrophy 
during the decades after the Civil War� As Assistant Secretary of the Navy prior 
to the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt, along with Mahan and senior Navy 
officials, had advocated to Congress that a sufficient fleet of U�S�-flag colliers be 
built to enable the Navy to forward-deploy� But this proposal never gained any 
traction, and Congress took no action on its own to support a revitalized U�S� 
Merchant Marine� Only warships, no colliers or supply ships, were authorized 
and built�43
Accordingly, in October of 1907, the Navy Department—now desperately in 
need of logistics ships—contracted for thirty foreign-flag colliers to supply the 
Great White Fleet on its voyage from Hampton Roads to San Francisco� The ma-
jority of these were British-flag merchant ships� In an interview just after the fleet 
began its voyage, contemporary German naval critic Graf Ernst zu Reventlow 
underscored that “the lack of supply ships and colliers left the Americans and 
the Great White Fleet in a highly vulnerable position given their dependency on 
foreign flag ships, especially British ships�”44 He would be proved right� In total, 
more than forty-one British merchant ships were chartered to carry coal and sup-
plies for the Great White Fleet during the around-the-world voyage� Many other 
foreign ships, mostly European, also were chartered�45 As expected, there were 
many more chartered supply ships supporting the Great White Fleet than there 
were warships on the voyage�46 (It is important to emphasize that any requirement 
to resupply naval ordnance would have necessitated even more supply ships�)
In the Pacific, the U�S� Navy learned firsthand the dangers of becoming too de-
pendent on foreign-flag ships to carry the fleet’s coal� During a portion of the Pa-
cific voyage, no colliers were available to resupply the fleet� Some historians have 
suggested that diplomatic tensions over a possible U�S�-German alliance against 
a Japanese-British alliance caused the British to withdraw their coal ships—and 
their coal—for a period� The coal was as important as the ships: during this part 
of the Pacific voyage, the U�S� Navy was forced to buy Australian coal, which was 
inferior in quality, requiring nearly half again as much to achieve the same output 
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from the fleet’s boilers�47 Rear Admiral Charles S� Sperry (the fleet commander 
on the later part of the voyage) noted in subsequent congressional testimony that 
this demonstrated clearly how Great Britain “could control the actions of the 
fleet�”48 Exacerbating this problem, throughout the voyage there were frequent 
rendezvous problems with contracted foreign-flag vessels; in some cases, they 
simply never met the fleet�49
Coal was not the only commodity dependent on shipping that was less than 
fully reliable� When the Great White Fleet was in the Mediterranean, an earth-
quake in Italy created a serious humanitarian crisis� Admiral Sperry dispatched 
the U�S� supply ship USS Culgoa to assist� But the fleet depended on this one 
ship for food and other supplies, so to compensate the Navy chartered a British-
flag ship, SS Republic, to bring food and supplies to the fleet while it was in the 
Mediterranean� Unfortunately, Republic sank in a collision in fog with another 
vessel� Fear of famine created widespread panic throughout the fleet� It was only 
when the Royal Navy provided the Great White Fleet with basic rations from its 
stores at Gibraltar that the crisis was averted� Additional food and supplies from 
America never did arrive, but through strict rationing the fleet successfully sailed 
from Gibraltar to Hampton Roads�50
On February 21, 1909, the Great White Fleet steamed majestically into Hamp-
ton Roads to a huge celebration and a proud president and nation� The U�S� 
Navy had accomplished a magnificent feat, and for the most part had gained the 
respect of seafaring nations across the globe�
CRITICISM, AND VULNERABILITIES EXPOSED
Even before the Great White Fleet departed on its voyage, critics noted that the 
lack of a U�S� Merchant Marine limited the ability of the Navy to forward-deploy, 
much less to sail around the world in a conflict situation� Senator Eugene Hale 
(R-ME, 1881–1911), chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, was ap-
palled that the magnificent battleships of the U�S� Navy were almost completely 
dependent “on the indulgence of foreign powers” to forward-deploy on any voy-
age beyond the Atlantic Seaboard�51 In a Senate debate and congressional hear-
ing, Senator Hale was quoted as saying that “due to the lack of U�S� flag colliers 
and supply ships, the Great White Fleet was ‘as useless as a painted ship upon a 
painted ocean�’”52
The fact that the Great White Fleet was almost completely dependent on hav-
ing foreign-flag commercial ships, especially of the British merchant marine, 
available to follow the fleet around the world to resupply it was not revealed fully 
until after the fleet had returned to the United States�53 Indeed, it is curious that 
during the period of the voyage the Germans had been hoping to establish an 
alliance between their country and the United States for a possible war against 
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Japan and Britain� What the Germans apparently did not consider is that the size 
and capability of the U�S� Navy mattered not, because without sufficient USN 
logistics ships and an American merchant marine capable of resupplying the 
fleet, any U�S� naval contribution to a war against Japan and Britain would have 
been negligible�54
With the successful return of the Great White Fleet to the United States, the 
Navy enjoyed substantial support from the public, Congress, and the press� That 
said, the voyage exposed significant vulnerabilities in the Navy and its ability to 
project power around the world� As Scientific American noted, “We refer to our 
great shortage of colliers and to the fact that had it not been for the foreign bot-
toms in which coal was shipped to the fleet at various points of rendezvous, it 
would have been impossible for this voyage to have been made� � � � [In a wartime 
setting] with no colliers of our own available to carry the necessary fuel, our six-
teen battleships would have been as useless as so many anchored�”55
Following the return of the fleet in 1909, Congress became fully aware of 
the serious lack of U�S�-flag colliers and supply ships and the Navy’s absolute 
dependence on foreign-flag merchant ships to deploy on voyages beyond the 
continental United States� This shortage obviously rendered the Navy impotent 
in potential conflicts far from U�S� shores� In a March 20, 1908, Senate debate 
on a shipping bill amending the 1891 Act to Provide for Ocean Mail Service be-
tween the United States and Foreign Ports, and to Promote Commerce, Senator 
Newlands of Nevada noted that the War Industries Board had been consulted 
regarding the needs of the U�S� Navy in case of a war� The board indicated that 
“about 232 commercial ships and/or auxiliaries would be needed to use as scouts, 
transports, colliers, and dispatch boats�” Senator Newlands commented that “we 
all know we have no such merchant marine as well as such supply ships�”56
Through the course of several congressional hearings and debates after the 
voyage of the Great White Fleet, it was acknowledged that a sizable U�S� Merchant 
Marine was critical to national security, and yet Congress took little action until 
the eve of World War I to support a commercial merchant marine� In the absence 
of a robust U�S� Merchant Marine, and realizing the critical vulnerability the lack 
of logistics ships and commercial vessels represented, the Navy in 1908, with 
the consent of Congress, allocated 59 percent of its ship-construction budget to 
building a new fleet of Navy colliers and supply ships�57
AMERICA’S TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY NAVY— 
LESSONS LEARNED OR FORGOTTEN?
One hundred twenty-five years after the publication of Mahan’s Influence of Sea 
Power upon History and 110 years after the voyage of the Great White Fleet, the 
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Navy’s Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready, 
issued in 2015, stated in part:
Forward naval presence is essential to strengthening alliances and partnerships, pro-
viding the secure environment necessary for an open economic system based on the 
free flow of goods, protecting U�S� natural resources, promoting stability, deterring 
conflict, and responding to aggression� As global maritime commerce expands, popu-
lations increase, competition for energy and natural resources grows, and advanced 
military technologies proliferate across the oceans and through the littoral, so too will 
challenges arise for anyone operating in those regions� 
The American people will continue to rely on the Sea Services to respond to fast-
changing and complex world events that threaten the security of the United States 
and our allies and partners�58
Although international objectives may have changed, the importance of sea 
power that Mahan formulated has not diminished� In fact, given the rapid growth 
of navies around the world over the last twenty years, there is little question that 
great world powers are as eager today to possess large and powerful navies as na-
tions were more than a century ago� It can be argued that currently there is under 
way a naval arms race much like that which occurred in the early years of the 
twentieth century� For decades after the end of the Cold War, the U�S� Navy had 
no near-peer competitor; this situation has changed considerably in recent years 
with the rapid growth of navies around the world�
Unfortunately, it seems that many operational strategists and planners have 
almost forgotten some of the lessons learned from the voyage of the Great White 
Fleet regarding fleet logistics� This is especially true when it comes to realizing the 
importance of a U�S� Merchant Marine in deploying all the armed forces around 
the world, including the Navy, as Mahan discussed� The coal-burning battleships 
of the Great White Fleet required refueling after one to two weeks’ steaming 
time, depending on voyage speed� Yes, today’s nuclear-powered carriers and 
submarines can steam for decades without refueling, but gas turbine–powered 
destroyers and cruisers require fuel nearly as often as coal-burning steamships 
did, and much more often if they are engaged in combat operations� In addition, 
maintaining combat air operations requires a carrier to replenish jet fuel at least 
every five days�59 Simply put, Navy combatants today are as dependent on logis-
tics ships as their predecessors were during the voyage of the Great White Fleet�
TODAY’S STRATEGIC SEALIFT/LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES
To keep warships and land and air forces forward deployed and capable of 
fighting, the military today has an asset that did not exist a century ago: 
TRANSCOM� One of its component commands, Military Sealift Command, 
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provides logistics sealift for all the armed services� MSC’s mission is clear: “Mili-
tary Sealift Command exists to support the joint warfighter across the full spec-
trum of military operations� Our mission is timeless and essential� Regardless of 
the challenge, we prevail! Working seamlessly with key partners to master the 
maritime and cyber domains, MSC provides on-time logistics, strategic sealift, 
as well as specialized missions anywhere in the world, under any condition, 24/7, 
365 days a year�”60
MSC is a capable, well-organized, and efficient organization with numerous 
missions� Supporting all the armed forces, MSC operates nearly 130 ships around 
the world� MSC ships are divided into eight mission sets: fleet oilers, special 
mission, prepositioning, service support, sealift, fleet ordnance and dry cargo, 
afloat staging, and expeditionary fast transport� Specifically to provide Navy 
fleet-logistics support around the world, MSC operates fifteen fleet oilers and 
fourteen fleet ordnance and dry-cargo ships� Other MSC ships support the Army 
and Air Force and other essential military missions not related to supplying Navy 
ships�61 MSC government-owned, U�S� Naval Service ships are crewed by civilian, 
government-employee mariners� Many other MSC vessels are commercial mer-
chant ships chartered to provide logistics support for all U�S� armed forces around 
the world� These ships are crewed by civilian, union mariners�
The Maritime Administration (part of the U�S� Department of Transportation) 
has complementary government and commercial strategic sealift capabilities to 
support all the armed forces� MARAD’s primary government sealift asset is the 
RRF, which consists of forty-six former merchant ships: thirty-five roll-on/roll-off 
(RO/RO) vessels, eight of which are fast sealift support vessels; two heavy-lift or 
barge-carrying ships; six auxiliary crane ships; one tanker; and two aviation-repair 
vessels� These ships are dedicated to strategic sealift, and when activated in times 
of national emergency they fall under the operational control of MSC� RRF ships 
are berthed at various U�S� ports� Each is expected to be fully operational within 
its assigned five- or ten-day readiness status, thence to sail to designated load-
ing berths� Through competitive contracts, commercial U�S� ship-management 
companies provide systems maintenance, equipment repairs, logistics support, 
activation, and operations management for RRF vessels� American civilian mari-
ners contracted through maritime labor unions constitute the crews�62
MARAD’s commercial sealift capability also includes managing the Maritime 
Security Program (MSP), which provides an annual operating subsidy for sixty 
commercial cargo ships under the U�S� flag� This program supports an active, 
privately owned, U�S�-flag and U�S�-crewed liner fleet in international trade, 
which becomes available to support Department of Defense (DoD) sustainment 
operations when necessary� The MSP facilitates maintenance of a base labor pool 
of approximately 2,400 American mariners available to crew government and 
commercial ships in times of peace and war�63
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Finally, MARAD also oversees the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement 
(VISA) program� The VISA program is a partnership between the U�S� gov-
ernment and the maritime industry to provide DoD with “assured access” to 
commercial sealift and intermodal capacity to support routine and emergency 
deployment and sustainment of U�S� military forces� The VISA program enables 
DoD to benefit from the maximum use of a modern, global logistics network 
and intermodal capabilities, including dry-cargo ships, shoreside equipment, 
terminal facilities, and intermodal management services� All MSP ships are part 
of the VISA program�64
The global strategic sealift capability of the U�S� military through 
USTRANSCOM’s MSC and MARAD and the programs these organizations 
administer is, indeed, impressive, and is unmatched by any other nation� These 
entities’ efficiency and effectiveness have been proved in countless U�S� military 
deployments; the battle testing they received during Operations ENDURING 
FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM was especially significant�
However, compliments aside, there is growing concern that the strategic sealift 
(logistics) nightmares the Navy faced during the voyage of the Great White Fleet 
could affect similarly (i�e�, negatively) not only the deployment and readiness of 
USN combatants but the forward deployment of all U�S� armed forces, traceable 
to some of the same factors the Great White Fleet experienced�
Clearly the strategic sealift capabilities of the U�S� military in general, and the 
U�S� Navy in particular, are greatly superior to those of the U�S� Navy of a century 
ago� However, the size of the American fleet, the missions of the U�S� Navy and 
the military as a whole, and the degree of forward deployment of U�S� forces also 
are vastly greater and more complicated than they were a century ago� As impres-
sive as the voyage of the Great White Fleet was, it pales in comparison with what 
the U�S� military does every day around the world in the current era� In other 
words, although the strategic sealift capabilities of the United States are impres-
sive, so too are the demands on and potential challenges to the capabilities of the 
logistics system that supports the Navy and the military as a whole�
For decades, the U�S� Navy has faced no capable competitors as it sailed the 
seven seas� For decades, USN task forces and ships have engaged in combat op-
erations around the world, with no serious threat from other forces� For decades, 
U�S� military strategic sealift ships, whether government owned or commercial, 
could sail throughout the world with no threat of attack from an enemy� Now 
this situation has changed completely� Today, enemy threats on logistics ships 
abound, whether in the form of kinetic strikes or a loss of control and incapaci-
tation from cyber-warfare attacks� There are other challenges as well, some of 
which are discussed in the sections that follow�
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Lack of a Sizable U.S. Merchant Marine
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s most famous work, The Influence of Sea Power upon His-
tory, published in 1890, drew from a series of lectures he gave at the Naval War 
College� In the book he concluded that merchant shipping was both a source of 
maritime power and something that navies naturally needed to defend�65 As if 
to prove Mahan’s point, shortly after the book’s publication, during the Spanish-
American War, the United States found itself without the commercial shipping it 
needed to support the U�S� Navy� In fact, it was necessary to charter and purchase 
foreign-flag ships to resupply U�S� fleets during the war, and only serendipity 
enabled the United States to do so�66
The lack of a sizable U�S� Merchant Marine for economic and strategic sea-
lift manifested itself again at the outbreak of World War I� European belliger-
ents removed their vessels from U�S� trade, which seriously damaged the U�S� 
economy�67 Recurrence of the same problem in World War II was partially 
avoided by the vision of the Franklin D� Roosevelt administration and Congress, 
which enacted the Merchant Marine Act of 1936� This legislation initiated a mas-
sive buildup of commercial shipyards and the construction of huge numbers of 
U�S�-flag merchant ships�68
Today, there are more than ninety thousand commercial ships in the world, a 
majority of which are engaged in global deep-sea trade�69 (This figure does not 
include hundreds of thousands of inland commercial vessels�) The nation owning 
and controlling the most merchant ships is China, with more than 5,400 vessels 
registered, mostly in China (and Hong Kong), but with hundreds of other Chi-
nese ships registered in flag-of-convenience (FOC) nations�70 The United States 
has only eighty-one merchant ships in international trade under the U�S� flag� 
The majority of these ships are operated by U�S� companies that are subsidiaries 
of larger shipping companies that are owned and located in other nations, such as 
Denmark, Switzerland, Germany, and France� (Sixty of these ships are supported 
through MARAD’s MSP�)71
The question is whether in a global conflict involving the United States there 
would be enough U�S�-flag ships to support the U�S� armed forces, including the 
U�S� Navy� The answer is: possibly� However, the crux of the problem is this: if, in 
a contested environment, U�S�-flag shipping experienced casualties, there is no 
reserve of commercial, U�S�-flag ships on which to call; there is no “bench,” so to 
speak� Could the United States rely on foreign ships registered in other countries 
and crewed by foreign nationals? If there were no MSC or other commercial, 
U�S�-flag vessels available, could the U�S� Navy rely on foreign-flag ships to resup-
ply a task force? Possibly yes—but quite possibly no� So, if foreign-flag ships and 
crews were not available because of particular circumstances (and one can think 
of many combinations of factors that would have that effect), the U�S� military 
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very quickly would be immobilized, rendered incapable of carrying on a fight far 
from U�S� shores� The Navy of today would be in the same position as the Great 
White Fleet more than a century ago�
Today, USN task forces are resupplied by the fifteen fleet oilers and fourteen 
ordnance and dry-cargo ships that MSC operates� These ships draw fuel and 
supplies from various depots around the world, in both U�S� and foreign ports� 
Depots in the United States are supplied by U�S�-flag merchant vessels; depots 
in other countries are supplied by both U�S�- and foreign-flag ships� However, 
there are only six U�S�-flag product tankers to supply fuel for the entire U�S� Navy 
around the world�72 There are no other U�S�-flag tankers in international trade, 
and very few, if any, other product tankers in domestic trade that could be used in 
an emergency� In a manner similar to its practice during the voyage of the Great 
White Fleet, the Navy today frequently relies on foreign-flag tankers and cargo 
ships to carry Navy fuel and supplies because of the limited number of U�S�-flag 
merchant ships�73
In a contested environment, if one or more of the limited number of MSC 
or U�S�-flag merchant ships were taken out of action by kinetic or cyber means, 
would there be a work-around? Quite possibly no�
Inability to Protect Logistics Ships
There is great concern about the Navy’s ability to protect logistics ships, both 
government owned and commercial� Of course, the U�S� Navy has substantial 
war-fighting capabilities; however, the Navy’s fleet of combatant ships currently 
(in 2018) numbers 272 ships and submarines, and these vessels already have 
multiple war-fighting missions that stretch the capabilities of the fleet substan-
tially�74 In a 2014 congressional hearing on sealift force requirements, the deputy 
commander of TRANSCOM was asked about the ability of the Navy to protect 
logistics ships� He replied as follows: “So in terms of protecting ships as they go 
across [the ocean] we—just so you know—we don’t have a lot of attrition built 
into our modeling� So we � � � that’s not something we build in there�” In other 
words, although the United States has substantial strategic sealift capability, even 
modestly successful kinetic or cyber attacks on MSC, RRF, or MSP/VISA mer-
chant ships could have far-reaching consequences for the Navy and the military’s 
ability to forward-deploy and conduct combat operations�75 Simply put, currently 
no doctrine is in place to protect merchant shipping, and protection for strategic 
sealift vessels is not factored adequately into U�S� policies or plans�
Nonavailability of U.S. Mariners
During the numerous conflicts of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, there 
have been no examples of U�S�-flag carriers refusing to offer their ships in times 
of national emergency� Similarly, there have been no examples of American 
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merchant mariners refusing to enter contested environments and thereby pre-
venting U�S�-flag ships from serving the military� Quite to the contrary, U�S� mer-
chant mariners have served with distinction in all U�S� conflicts� During World 
War II, for example, nearly six thousand U�S� merchant mariners were killed or 
lost at sea� This represents the greatest percentage loss of any U�S� service during 
the war�76 (One in twenty-six mariners serving on U�S� merchant ships during the 
war died in the line of duty�)77
Some have suggested that foreign ships and mariners might be available to 
serve the logistics needs of the military in a U�S� conflict� However, there is no 
guarantee this would work� Despite the relatively benign environment of the Per-
sian Gulf during the Gulf Wars, chartered foreign-flag ships and crews did refuse, 
on occasion, to deliver U�S� military cargoes�78 There are many political scenarios 
under which foreign vessels and their crews would be prohibited by their govern-
ments from supporting the U�S� military�
Clearly, the availability of experienced U�S� mariners is crucial for crewing the 
RRF, MSC commercial merchant ships on charter, and U�S�-flag ships in the MSP 
and VISA programs that are supporting military sealift� However, ensuring such 
availability in a future national emergency would require that there be an ad-
equate pool of available mariners� Just as important, there also must be a pipeline 
of younger mariners entering the commercial maritime workforce throughout 
the years ahead� All this can happen only if there is a stable U�S� Merchant Marine 
with a number of jobs adequate to ensure employment�
However, because of the shrinking number of commercial ships and commer-
cial seagoing billets, it has become increasingly difficult for younger mariners to 
gain the sea time and experience necessary to raise the level of their commercial 
licenses and to sail in positions of higher responsibility�79 As the U�S� Merchant 
Marine continues to decline, the number of available jobs in the industry also 
decreases� Senior leaders at TRANSCOM and MARAD are deeply concerned 
that the military readiness of the United States is currently at risk because the de-
clining number of U�S�-flag commercial ships means the pool of available, expe-
rienced mariners continues to get smaller�80 At the present time, it is questionable 
whether there would be enough American mariners available during a conflict—
particularly a long one—and the picture grows bleaker with each passing year�81
Effectively U.S. Controlled Ships Dwindling
Ships owned by Americans and U�S� interests but flagged in other countries, 
particularly FOC countries, have been termed effectively U.S. controlled (EUSC) 
ships� The theory is that these vessels would be available to the United States in 
times of national emergency� Expecting and relying on the availability of EUSC 
shipping constituted a long-standing policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff� In 1989, 
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for example, President George H� W� Bush signed a National Security Sealift 
Policy that reiterated the importance of EUSC shipping as part of the military’s 
strategic sealift capability�82
However, the problems with relying on EUSC shipping are twofold� First, 
while the owners of EUSC ships theoretically might be willing to support the 
United States in a national emergency, there is no guarantee that the flag states 
of those EUSC vessels would allow them to be used to support U�S� interests 
or objectives� For example, Panama has the largest number of merchant ships 
registered under its flag� China owns 534 vessels under the Panamanian flag�83 
A Chinese company operates the two major marine terminals on the ends of 
the Panama Canal, and the Chinese have numerous other business interests in 
Panama�84 For these reasons, the Panamanian government might be reluctant to 
allow the United States to use any vessel under Panamanian registry in a conflict 
between the United States and China� Further, EUSC vessels are crewed by for-
eign nationals, not Americans, and there is no guarantee that foreign crews would 
be willing to serve on EUSC vessels in a U�S� conflict�
In any case, because of U�S� tax laws passed in 1979 and 1986, American own-
ers of EUSC ships no longer can avoid paying taxes on their incomes� As a result, 
the number of EUSC ships has dwindled dramatically in the decades since�85 
Because there are fewer American citizens involved in EUSC shipping than in 
the past, it is no longer a viable source of ships for the American military in times 
of national emergency�86 Compounding this problem, of the vessels owned by 
Americans and registered in other countries, the proportion that are militarily 
useful is very small�
Aging of the Fleet
Companies that participate in and receive funds through MARAD’s MSP are re-
quired to keep relatively new ships in the program� This does not pose a particu-
larly onerous burden, since the participants’ parent companies (the vast majority 
of which are foreign owned) maintain large fleets of modern ships under other 
flags of registry� MSP operators are encouraged to replace aging MSP vessels with 
newer ships, and must replace them before they reach age-out limits defined in 
the MSP� This keeps newer vessels composing the MSP-VISA fleet�
The situation with the Ready Reserve Force is quite different� RRF vessels 
are largely foreign-built vessels, plus some U�S�-built vessels constructed and 
operated commercially in the late 1970s and early ’80s� Some RRF vessels are 
even older, with a few (such as the fast sealift vessels, former Sealand Services 
vessels) approaching and exceeding fifty years of age� Although well maintained 
by MARAD and the companies contracted to manage them, these formerly com-
mercial RRF ships were not designed and built for half-century life cycles�
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For MSC and MARAD to maintain the state of readiness necessary to provide 
emergency strategic sealift, it is critical to have a solid and continually well-
funded vessel-replacement program in place� Yet current budget constraints 
make this a daunting challenge� This puts at extreme risk the ability of MSC and 
MARAD to provide logistics ships for strategic sealift for all U�S� armed forces, 
including the U�S� Navy�
In a report delivered to the Secretary of the Navy in 1946, Fleet Admiral Ernest J� 
King noted, “Whatever else [World War II] is, so far as the United States is con-
cerned, it has been a war of logistics�”87
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 established the U�S� Transporta-
tion Command� With its component commands of AMC, SDDC, and MSC, 
USTRANSCOM fully integrated the military’s transportation modes, so that for 
the first time in history the U�S� military operated all its military transportation 
resources under a single command�88 TRANSCOM soon proved its worth in 
1990–91 with the buildup and war against Iraq in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT 
STORM, which together constituted one of the largest logistics deployments in 
history�89 TRANSCOM and its components have proved their efficiency and ef-
fectiveness continually since that time, most notably in Operations ENDURING 
FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM�
The voyage of the Great White Fleet of 1907–1909 demonstrated the emerg-
ing capabilities of the U�S� Navy and proved that the United States quickly was 
becoming a great world power� But it also revealed the critical importance of 
logistics and logistics ships in keeping a navy supplied in any forward-deployed 
situation� Although the voyage was completed successfully, there were many 
challenges and logistics near disasters during the voyage� This primarily was ow-
ing to the lack of U�S� logistics ships and the lack of a substantial U�S� Merchant 
Marine capable of supporting the U�S� Navy—and this was a peaceful operation, 
facing no threats from an enemy navy� The U�S� Navy and Congress learned from 
this voyage and, at least for a time, placed emphasis on developing Navy logistics 
capabilities using U�S�-flag ships� But these lessons had to be relearned in World 
War I and in the years leading up to World War II�
Given the massive responsibilities the U�S� military shoulders around the 
world today, it faces challenges similar to those the Great White Fleet faced more 
than a century ago—but on a much larger scale� As able and efficient as MSC, 
MARAD’s RRF, and the MSP/VISA fleets are, their capabilities were developed to 
operate at sea in an uncontested environment� None of the vessels in these fleets 
are capable of self-defense�
But the continuation of a benign environment on the seas of the world no 
longer can be assumed� In today’s world, in a conflict involving the United States, 
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sea lines of communication may pass through contested waters, and U�S� strategic 
sealift ships, whether government owned or commercial, may be attacked� World 
powers are building and operating powerful navies and intense cyber-attack 
capabilities� Even if the Navy were to develop doctrines and strategies to protect 
sealift ships, the number of USN warships available to protect logistics ships is 
very limited at best� In some scenarios, it would be next to impossible for the 
Navy to protect logistics ships in a heavily contested environment�
In the early years of World War II, the Germans had the ability to deploy only 
one to two dozen submarines at any one time� Yet because defense of merchant 
vessels supporting the British economy and war effort was inadequate or non-
existent, the Germans nonetheless were able to sink six million tons of British 
shipping from 1939 to 1941�90 This represented more than 1,400 ships sunk by 
a small fleet of German submarines�91 The naval resources needed to defeat the 
German submarine threat in the Battle of the Atlantic ultimately were staggering, 
running into the hundreds of billions in today’s dollars�92
In the Pacific, the Japanese did not mount an effective defense of their logis-
tics ships or their merchant marine� Their lack of doctrine and maritime trade– 
warfare defense enabled the U�S� Navy to destroy more than eight million tons of 
Japanese logistics and merchant marine vessels, virtually eviscerating the Japa-
nese economy and war machine and starving the nation�93
In other words, without sufficient protection of logistics and U�S�-flag mer-
chant ships today, losses from an even modestly capable enemy could be sub-
stantial� The problem is compounded by the limited numbers of MSC, RRF, and 
MSP ships available and of American mariners to crew them� The loss of one or 
more of the twenty large, medium-speed, RO/RO (LMSR) vessels in MSC’s fleet 
(each of which has a capacity of between 290,000 and 380,000 square feet of cargo 
space) would have catastrophic effects on a U�S� Army deployment that depended 
on the timely arrival of supplies and equipment�94 The loss of one or more of the 
six American commercial tankers on charter to MSC or the fifteen MSC fleet 
oilers or fourteen MSC ordnance and dry-cargo ships could devastate Navy re-
supply of one or more task forces� The same would be the case if the foreign-flag 
tankers on which MSC depends no longer were available�
The logistical issues and the lack of USN logistics and American commercial 
merchant ships nearly paralyzed the around-the-world voyage of the Great White 
Fleet and provided powerful and enduring lessons that need to be looked at with 
fresh eyes today� In his 1908 congressional testimony, Senator Newlands noted 
that “[i]n case of war these fighting ships would, without an auxiliary navy [i�e�, 
logistics ships], be absolutely derelict in the ocean, unable to move� Our Navy 
may be compared to a man with strong lungs and a strong heart, perfect organs, 
without legs or arms� � � � We need above all things, a proportionate Navy, one that 
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is perfect in every essential particular, not simply the ships that are necessary 
for fighting, but the ships that are necessary to sustain the ships that do the 
fighting�”95
This observation is just as true today as in 1908, and not just for the Navy but 
for the entire U�S� military�
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